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Abstract
We analyze the choice often faced by countries of whether to directly intervene to
counter an external terrorist threat or to subsidize a foreign government to do it.
We present a model which analyzes this policy choice where two countries, home
and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country
chooses how much to invest in defending itself and in reducing terrorist resources
either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself
and risking destabilizing the foreign country. We use backward induction to solve a
multiple stage game where the home country first commits to its policy decisions, then
the foreign country chooses the effort it expends on reducing terrorist capability and
finally, the terrorists decide their effort in attacking in the home or foreign country.
Using a calibrated model, we are able to show that, for the chosen parameter values,
direct intervention is only an equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not good
substitutes in the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. A
higher relative military efficiency by the home country makes intervention more likely.
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1 Introduction
In military conflicts, a recurrent policy choice is the extent to which one should fight
oneself, by direct intervention, or subsidize allies to fight for you. To help understand
this issue, we provide a model in which a home country can invest in: defending itself
against the enemy; direct intervention by attacking the enemy; or indirect intervention by
subsidising a foreign ally to fight the enemy. As we shall show, this choice will depend
on both the relative costs and the degree of substitutability between direct and indirect
intervention.
For example, in recent years there have been debates in the US and Europe about
intervention in Libya and Syria, in France about intervention in Mali, and in Kenya about
intervention in Somalia. Russia has faced the choice between just supporting proxies or
also committing its own troops as it did in Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and Syria in
2015. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan and, with the help of
the Northern Alliance, displaced the Taliban government. After the invasion, the US had
the choice of fighting the Taliban directly or just indirectly by providing military aid to
foreign “allied” governments in Afghanistan or Pakistan, to encourage their efforts against
the Taliban. The direct attacks on the Taliban could be done with boots on the ground or
using unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, usually known as drones. The political economy
of the US use of drones is discussed in Hall and Coyne (2014). While we focus on coercive
interventions, there may also be non-coercive interventions designed to win ”hearts and
minds”.
A historical example is British policy during the 18th and 19th centuries. Not only
did it defend itself against invasion by France, but it repeatedly subsidized allies to fight
France either alongside Britain or instead of Britain. Britain could afford to support allies,
having an effective tax system and good credit which allowed her to borrow. Ferguson
(2001) argues that the combination of a Parliament, tax bureaucracy, national debt and
central bank gave Britain a decisive military advantage over its main rival France: finance
as much as firepower decided the fate of nations. To reflect this, in our model, we will
assume that the home country is a relatively rich hegemonic power, which gives it a
credible first mover advantage. The British strategic choices also reflected the degree of
substitution between British and allied forces and the relative military effectiveness of
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each against the French. British naval power and the landbased power of its allies were
poor substitutes and defeating the French required fighting on land in Europe, something
its allies could do more effectively than Britain. The model will also reflect that there are
risks for foreign allies. The British allies who provided the armies often did so at the cost
of being overthrown, after defeat by France for instance.
In our model, a home country can invest in defensive effort, direct intervention effort or
a subsidy to an allied country’s military effort. Depending on circumstances, one observes
countries investing in one, two or all three of these alternatives. Thus allowing for corner
solutions, zero investment in one or more of the alternatives, is important. The model
is a three stage complete information game.1 We will label the enemy terrorists, and
think of them being located in the allied country, though the enemy could be insurgents
in a civil war enemy or another country. We assume that the home government acts
first, committing to the amounts invested in defense, direct intervention and the subsidy
to the foreign ally. The foreign ally then commits to counter-terrorist effort. Finally
the terrorists choose the effort they devote to attacking the home and foreign countries.
These attacks then succeed with some probability. Our model also allows for the fact
that the direct intervention may destabilise the foreign ally through unintended, though
anticipated, consequences.
Our main purpose is to examine what determines which alternatives appear in the
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) strategy of the home country and how the
chosen alternatives depend on the technology of the interaction between direct and indirect
intervention. We begin with general functional forms, which allows us to highlight the
different strategic effects present in the model. Some results are as one might expect. For
instance, an increase in either direct intervention or allied effort will reduce the resources
available to the terrorists and their ability to attack both the home and foreign country. An
increase in defensive investment by home causes the terrorists to switch their target from
the home country to the foreign country. However, the analysis also brings out that these
effects often counteract each other, producing ambiguous results. For instance, the impact
of the home government’s defense and direct intervention on the ally’s effort is ambiguous,
depending on the size of the counteracting effects. This is to be expected; the nature of such
1We discuss the complete information assumption together with the other assumptions in Section 2.
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strategic interactions is likely to be sensitive to the particular circumstances of the conflict.
These circumstances will differ from case to case, thus there are no ”typical” values of
the parameters. In particular, direct intervention can take many different forms: cyber-
warfare, drones, manned aircraft, covert special forces, intelligence operatives, standard
land forces, etc.
The full equilibrium of the model is analytically intractable and we must therefore
rely on numerical solutions. However some partial equilibria results are possible, but
even there signs are often ambiguous: actions have offsetting effects, a characteristic of
conflict. Numerical computation involves assuming specific functional forms, simulating
calibrated models, to allow us to obtain comparative statics results for the full set of
equilibrium strategies presented in the game. We impose ranges for some parameters,
but calibrate others to target outcomes which at least in principle are observable. Then,
we investigate the effect of parameter variations within these ranges on the likelihood of
non-zero investments in each of the three alternatives in specific circumstances. We are
not trying to match a particular set of empirical data, conflicts are too varied. Rather we
investigate a reasonable range of imposed parameters and target outcomes. We then relate
particular parameterisations to examples of conflicts which would fit such circumstances.
We are particularly interested in the extent to which the degree of substitution between
home and foreign military efforts and the relative outcomes effectiveness of the two coun-
tries’ efforts determine whether direct intervention is an equilibrium outcome. Given this,
a constant elasticity of substitution production function is a natural way to parameterize
the aggregation of home and allied forces.
Our analysis indicates that, if the forces of the home country and the foreign ally
are fairly close substitutes, subsidising the ally has a positive effect on the ally’s efforts,
making an investment in subsidy more likely, while direct intervention may crowd out allied
effort, making intervention less likely. However, if the efforts are not close substitutes,
such as air power provided by the home country and ”boots on the ground” provided
by the ally, investment in direct intervention becomes part of an equilibrium strategy.
In many circumstances, the degree of substitution may be low if the allies have local
knowledge and expertise and if foreign occupying forces are seen as illegitimate by the
local population.Salehyan (2010) The balance between subsidy and direct intervention
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will also depend on the relative military effectiveness of the forces of the two countries as
well as the degree of substitutability. Using comparative statics around our equilibrium
non-intervention state, we show that direct military intervention becomes more likely as its
relative military effectiveness increases. Higher military effectiveness needs not correspond
to higher technology, for instance the foreign ally, e.g. Pakistan, may be more effective
at infiltrating terrorist networks as they may have a shared identity through language,
religion or culture.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation of our
model to the literature. Section 3 formally describes the game, sets out the equilibrium
and provides some useful analytical results. Section 4 provides the quantitative analysis
of the equilibrium calibrated to fit the outcomes to stylized facts. Section 5 concludes.
2 Features of the model
Before conducting the formal analysis, this section discusses some features of our model
and relates it to the literature. The model broadly follows the framework used by Bandy-
opadhyay et al. (2011), hereafter BSY, which explains general aid rather than direct in-
tervention, the focus of our analysis. Our model differs from BSY in the central choice
variables and the methodology used to analyse the comparative statics. In their paper,
the counter-terrorist strategy of the home country has three elements. Their first two
choice variables, defensive effort and military subsidy, are the same as us, but their third
element is a general subsidy that acts as a lump sum transfer to the resources of the foreign
country. They analyze the interaction between the different decision variables along the
backward induction solution of the model. They present a comparative statics result of a
change in the utility weight that the terrorist group puts on the home country’s interests
on the equilibrium strategies. However, they note on p440 that comparative statics that
involve all three choice variables are analytically intractable, thus they analyse a reduced
form model which ignores regime instability and where general aid is not a choice variable
for the home government. In contrast, our quantitative methodological approach allows
us to conduct a set of comparative statics on the full counter-terrorist strategies for the
home country. We also do not need to make the assumption that third order derivatives
are zero that they require.
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Like BSY, we consider a complete information game. In practice, the home or foreign
country may not be able to monitor the effort or type of the other country from their
observed actions. Brauer and van Tuyl (2008), chapter 3, examine the principal-agent
problem faced by Renaissance Italian Cities who hired Condottieri to fight for them. In
this case, there were significant problems of moral hazard and adverse selection and the
Condottieri often found it more profitable to attack the city that hired them, rather
than that city’s enemies. There is also a literature on asymmetric information games
with terrorists (see e.g., Lapan and Sandler (1993) and Arce and Sandler (2007), Arce
and Sandler (2010)). Salehyan (2010) uses a principal agent framework, though not a
formal model, to examine the choice between attacking an enemy directly and indirectly
through the support of insurgents operating in your enemy’s country. He emphasises the
importance of both divergent interests and informational asymmetries. We focus on the
divergent interests of the home and foreign countries rather than incomplete information,
since the former is likely to be more important in practice. In addition, introducing
asymmetric information would add to the complexity of what is already a complex model.
We assume that the terrorists are the only enemies that the home and foreign gov-
ernment face. In practice, each may have multiple enemies. In particular, the foreign
government may face a regional rival and divert the military aid, which the home gov-
ernment intended to be used against the terrorists, to use against the rival. In such
circumstances, Boutton (2014) argues that the foreign government may have an incentive
not to disarm terrorist groups, but rather to play up the threat from terrorism in order
to continue receiving aid. For instance, he argues that Pakistan, seeing India as a greater
threat than the Taliban, diverted a substantial portion of the US military aid, intended for
use against the Taliban, to boost its military capability to fight India. He finds that while
US foreign aid can help decrease terrorist activity in non-rivalrous states, the opposite is
true in states with at least one rival. A similar argument is also made in Bapat (2011),
there a stylized game theoretical framework is presented where military aid, rather than
eliminating the terrorist threat, simply keeps host states from negotiating with the terror-
ists. Boutton (2014) is primarily an empirical paper and does not provide a formal model
of the process. Neither our model nor that of BSY allows for such an effect explicitly, but
it could be implicitly allowed for by adjustments to the equation determining allied efforts
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against the terrorists as a function of home country subsidy.
Our concept of direct intervention effort can be linked to the idea of pre-emptive
effort present in a large closely related literature. Counter-terrorist efforts tend to be
described in two basic types: defensive effort and pre-emptive or pro-active effort. The
basic difference between the two is that, whereas defensive effort makes it harder for
terrorists to attack specific targets (see e.g., Sandler and Lapan (1988)), pre-emptive
effort has a direct negative impact on the success probability of attack or damage on any
target (see e.g., Sandler and Siqueira (2006) and Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011)). A
key element of pre-emptive effort is that a country can commit to it before the terrorists’
group decides the attack efforts.2 In our paper, direct intervention effort is committed to
before the terrorists’ choices and it affects the resources that the terrorists have at their
disposal to organize terrorist attacks. However, direct intervention effort also affects the
counter-terrorist effort of the foreign country, where terrorists are assumed to be based.
We assume that direct intervention and foreign effort interact to determine the re-
sources available to the terrorists. We use a technology for this interaction which allows
for different levels of substitution between home and foreign efforts. Our modelling can
be related to Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014). In their paper, terrorism is set in the
context of immigration policy. Pre-emptive efforts lower the incentives that individuals
have to become terrorists. They endogeneize the production technology for terrorist dam-
age and assume that it is different for attacks on developing or developed countries, with
skilled terrorists being required for attacks on developed countries. They also assume that
the pre-emptive effort of the two target countries can affect different inputs of the produc-
tion technology. In their paper, the pre-emptive effort is the only choice variable that the
developed country has at its disposal, there is no trade off across policy options. Their
focus is the analysis of the comparative statics of the impact of exogenous immigration
policies on target country efforts and the comparison of different modeling frameworks in
relation to the timing of decisions of target countries (simultaneous versus sequential) or
the choice variable of the developed country (pre-emptive or defensive effort).
2Das and Chowdhury (2014) analyse the choice of attack or defense when a number of countries have a
common terrorist enemy and also argue that some of the assumptions used in the reduced form approach of
Sandler and Siqueira (2006) may not be robust to explicit modelling of terrorist behaviour. In particular,
they question the assumption that an increase in defence (security-deterrence) by one country induces the
terrorist organisation to focus more on other target countries.
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We assume that direct intervention by the home government could have ”blowback”
effects that help the terrorists. For instance, the continued US drone strikes in Pakistan,
despite repeated protests by the Pakistani government, has made the Pakistani government
seem ineffective and unable to maintain its sovereignty. This resulted in the Pakistani
government reducing co-operation with the US in anti-Taliban activities. In addition,
Boyle (2013), discussing the blowback from the US use of drones argues “that drone strikes
corrode the stability and legitimacy of local governments, deepen anti-American sentiment
and create new recruits for Islamist networks aiming to overthrow these governments.” If
such direct intervention undermines the legitimacy of the foreign government, this may
cause the population to be less supportive of the regime, thus less likely to provide the
regime with information about the terrorists. In either case, the probability of a successful
terrorist attack, either on the foreign country or the home country, is increased. For
convenience, we follow BSY and label this ”regime change”. In their case, the probability
of regime change increases with military subsidy and decreases with general aid, in our
framework we focus on the destabilizing impact of direct intervention. Rosendorff and
Sandler (2004) examine backlash or blowback effects of attacks on terrorists, on their
recruitment and on general grievance (see also Arce and Sandler (2010)), Bloom (2010) and
Jacobson and Kaplan (2007)). There is a substantial controversy over whether counter-
insurgency warfare is best prosecuted by military means or trying to win “heart and minds”
in order to lower population support for the terrorist group.3 Dear (2014) examines the
effectiveness of one form of direct military action: targeting the leaders of the terrorists. He
gives a number of examples where even killing terrorist leaders can be counter-productive.
For instance, the killing of a relatively moderate leader can lead to their replacement by a
much more violent leadership as happened with Boko Haram after the Nigerian government
killed Mohammad Yusuf in 2009.
This blowback that we label regime change is an anticipated, but undesired, by-product
of the direct intervention. Of course, foreign intervention may be designed to effect regime
change as in Aidt and Albornoz (2010) where foreign direct investments provide a motive
for the investing country to intervene in order to induce regime transitions or regime
3In another related paper, Dunne et al. (2006) prove that a defensive type of conflict can arise as
an equilibrium result of the conflict between an incumbent and a contestant group to avoid military
confrontation, which may encourage asymmetric conflict.
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consolidation. Bonfatti (2011) has a related model in which the rationale for foreign
intervention is to facilitate the rule of groups that are more dependent on foreign economic
policy. Bove et al. (2015) develop a three party model of the decision by a third party to
intervene in a civil war, emphasising the role of oil in motivating third party intervention.
3 The Game
3.1 Elements of the Game
In this section, we introduce the main elements of our model. There are three players, the
home country H who decides on defensive effort eH to counter terrorist attacks at home,
direct intervention (pro-active counter-terrorist effort), eHF , and indirect intervention, a
military aid package to a foreign ally F , the second player, to assist its efforts against the
third player, the terrorists.
Given our interest in corner solutions, an alternative to making investment eHF a con-
tinuous variable, would be to make it a discrete binary variable: either directly intervene
or not. Sometimes the decision is binary, bomb Syria or not; but often there is both a
discrete and a continuous dimension: decide whether to put troops into Afghanistan and
if so how many. In addition, from a modelling perspective making eHF continuous treats
it symmetrically with the investments in the other two alternatives.
The military aid package is a subsidy to allied effort αeF where eF is the effort chosen
by the foreign ally.
The third player is a terrorist organization who chooses attack effort aimed at the
home country, aH and the foreign country aF subject to their resource constraint
aH + aF =M(eF , eHF ); M1,M2 < 0, M11,M22 > 0. (1)
The counter-terrorist efforts of the home and foreign countries reduce the resources avail-
able to the terrorists. Thus the choice variables are eH , eHF and α for the home country,
eF for the foreign recipient country and, aH and aF for the terrorists.4
4Regarding partial and full derivatives, the following notation is adopted. Consider a function of two
variable f(x, y). Then f1 ≡
∂f
∂x
, f2 ≡
∂f
∂y
, f11 ≡
∂2f
∂x2
, f22 ≡
∂2f
∂y2
and f12 = f21 ≡
∂2f
∂x∂y
= ∂
2f
∂y∂x
in the usual
way. For conciseness for a function of one variable, f(x) we define f1 ≡
df
dx
and f11 ≡
d2f
dx2
. To completely
characterize the equilibrium we will need higher derivatives of the form f111 ≡
∂3f
∂x3
, f112 ≡
∂3f
∂x2∂y
etc.
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As discussed above, direct intervention may cause a regime change that increases
terrorist effectiveness. The probability of a regime change is given by
pF = pF (eHF ); pF1 > 0. (2)
The relative effectiveness of the efforts of the home and foreign countries in reducing
the resources of the terrorists, M(·) in (1), will play a central role in the model. Also
of importance will be the probabilities of a successful terrorist attack on country H and
country F and how these are affected by a regime change, the probability of which is given
by (2).
The probability of a successful terrorist attack on the home country H, in the absence
of regime change in the foreign country F , is determined by the defensive effort of H and
the effort terrorists devote to attacking H:
σH = σH(eH , aH); σH1 < 0, σ
H
2 > 0, σ
H
21 < 0, σ
H
11 > 0, σ
H
22 < 0. (3)
Regime change increases the probability of a successful terrorist attach to
σ˜H = (1 + η)σH (eH , aH). (4)
The probability of a successful terrorist attack on the foreign country F just depends on
the effort terrorists devote to attacking F :
σF = σF (aF ); σF1 > 0, σ
F
11 < 0. (5)
The counter-terrorist efforts of H and F will influence the probability of a successful
terrorist attack on F , through their impact on aF through (1). Again, if regime change
takes place, this is scaled up to
σ˜F = (1 + η)σF (aF ). (6)
We can now write down the resource constraints and the payoffs of the players. Country
Again for conciseness for a function of one variable, f(x), we denote f111 ≡
d3f
dx3
.
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H suffers not only from a successful terrorist attack at home, with a cost TH , but also from
a successful terrorist attack on country F , with a cost THF . This cost could arise from
various forms of interdependence, for instance because H has foreign direct investment in
country F, which can be damaged by terrorist attacks or because terrorist attacks disrupt
oil supplies from F to H. We define the potential national income of country H as Y¯ H ,
substitute for σ˜H and σ˜H from (4) and (6) and define
γ(eHF , η) ≡ 1 + pF (eHF )η. (7)
Then, the expected income of country H can be written
Y H = Y¯ H − (1− pF )(σHTH + σFTHF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(costs) without regime change
− pF (σ˜HTH + σ˜FTHF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(costs) with regime change
− (eH + eHF + αeF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
military-aid expend.
= Y¯ H − γ(eHF , η)[THσH(eH , aH) + THFσF (aF )]− (eH + eHF + αeF )
= UH(eH , eHF , α, eF , aH , aF ) (8)
The payoff of the H country can be written in terms of the choice variables as Y H =
UH(eH , eHF , α, eF , aH , aF ) where the direct, indirect efforts and the subsidy rate (eH , eHF , α)
are the choices of country H, the foreign country’s counter-terrorist effort eF is the choice
of country F, and the efforts devoted to attacking H and F , (aH , aF ), are the choices of
the terrorists.
Similarly, we have the expected national income for country F
Y F = Y¯ F − γ(eHF , η)σF (aF )TF − eF (1− α)
= UF (eF , eHF , α, aF ), (9)
where TF is the cost a successful terrorist attack inflicts on country F .
Finally, the aim of the terrorists is to inflict damage on countries H and F with weights
φH and φF = 1− φH respectively. Thus their payoff is
UT = γ(eHF , η)[φH{THσH(eH , aH) + THFσF (aF )}+ φFTFσF (aF )] (10)
= UT (eH , eHF , eF , aH , aF ).
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We have now described the military technology, resource constraints and payoffs for
each of the three players and can now consider the equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is a complete information backward induction outcome with
country H as first mover, country F as second mover and the terrorists as third mover.
Thus countryH is able to commit with respect to the moves of country F and the terrorists,
and country F can commit with respect to the terrorists. The backward solution can be
described in the following way:
• Stage 3: Terrorists maximize UT (eH , eHF , eF , aH , aF ) with respect to aH ≥ 0 and
aF ≥ 0 given their resource constraint (1) and given actions undertaken at stages 2
and 1, eF , eHF , eH and α,
• Stage 2: The F country maximizes UF (eF , eHF , α, aF ) with respect to eF ≥ 0
given the reaction function aF (eH , eHF , eF ) from stage 1 and given eH , eHF , α,
• Stage 1: The H country maximizes UH(eH , eHF , α, eF , aH , aF ) with respect to
eH ≥ 0, eHF ≥ 0, α ∈ [0, 1] given reaction functions aF (eH , eHF , eF ), aH(eH , eHF , eF )
and eF (eH , eHF , α).
We now proceed to describe the backward induction solution using general functions.
This will allow us to provide economic intuition of the strategic interactions between the
different decision makers. By focusing on the interior solutions, the use of the Implicit
Function Theorem will enable us to discuss the impact of the decisions of the home and
foreign countries on the decisions of the terrorists at stage 3 of the game. We will also be
able to discuss the impact of the decisions of the home government on the decisions of the
foreign country. The details of the first order conditions (FOCs) are given in Appendix
A. In Appendix B, we provide details of the application of the Implicit Function Theorem
at stages 2 and 3 in the game.
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3.2.1 Stage 3
To maximize (10) with respect to aF ≥ 0 and aH ≥ 0 given the constraint aH + aF ≤
M(eF , eHF ) and previous actions eH , eHF , eF , define the Lagrangian
L = σH(eH , aH) + τσF (aF ) + λM (M(eF , eHF )− aH − aF ) + λa
H
aH + λa
F
aF , (11)
where τ ≡ φ
HTHF+φF TF
φHTH
and λM , λa
H
, λa
F
≥ 0 are multipliers. Details of the first order
conditions, FOCs, are in Appendix A. Solving them gives the reaction functions of the
terrorists
aH = aH(eH , eHF , eF ), (12)
aF = aF (eH , eHF , eF ). (13)
Equations (12) and (13) constitute the stage 3 equilibrium given previous actions eH , eHF , eF .
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, it is straightforward to prove the following results
for interior solutions (see Appendix B for details).
aij(e
H , eHF , eF ) < 0 except aF1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) > 0. (14)
That is, an increase in either direct intervention effort or foreign government effort will
reduce the resources available to the terrorists and this will unambiguously reduce their
attack effort both at home and abroad. An increase in defensive home effort however will
discourage attack effort at home but it will encourage attack effort abroad.
It is also possible to prove (see Appendix B) that changes to the weights that the
terrorists put on attack on home country have an ambiguous effect on their attack efforts
(the signs of ∂a
H
∂φH
and ∂a
F
∂φH
are ambiguous). However, an increase in TH , the cost inflicted
on the home country by a successful attack, increases the attack effort that the terrorists
devote to the home country and reduces the effort devoted to the foreign country ( ∂a
H
∂TH
> 0
and ∂a
F
∂TH
< 0). These results are in line with BSY.
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3.2.2 Stage 2
At the second stage, country F maximizes its objective function (9) with respect to it
effort eF , given the reaction functions (12) and (13) and previous actions by country H,
eH , eHF and α. We define the Lagrangian
L = Y¯ F − γ(eHF , η)σF (aF )TF − eF (1− α) + λe
F
eF , (15)
where λe
F
≥ 0 is the multiplier.
The FOCs (see Appendix A for details) lead to the reaction function of country F
which can be written as
eF = eF (eH , eHF , α). (16)
Focusing on the interior solutions, Appendix B establishes that in general, the sign of
the impact of defensive effort or direct intervention on the effort of the foreign country
(eF1 (e
H , eHF , α) and eF2 (e
H , eHF , α)) are both ambiguous. However, an increase to the
military subsidy encourages foreign effort (eF3 (e
H , eHF , α) > 0).
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we can obtain the expression which will deter-
mine the sign of the impact of defensive effort on foreign effort:
eF1 =
γTF
(
σF11a
F
1 a
F
3 + σ
F
1 a
F
31
)
Y F
eF eF
.
Note that, for the second order conditions, SOCs, to hold we require concavity in the
objective function of the foreign government, Y F
eF eF
< 0 (the conditions for this to hold
are discussed in the Appendix). If following BSY, we assume third order derivatives of
the probability function are zero then, aF31 = 0 and e
F
1 would have a clear negative sign.
However, in general, the expression has an ambiguous sign. The reason is that although
an increase in such effort would encourage terrorist attack effort at foreign (aF1 > 0) and
therefore, lower the incentive for foreign effort since σF11 < 0, an increase in home defensive
effort will also affect the impact of foreign effort on attack effort of the terrorists in the
foreign country aF31, the sign of this will be in general ambiguous.
The impact of direct intervention on foreign effort is given by
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eF2 =
TFaF3
(
γ1σ
F
1 + γσ
F
11a
F
2
)
+γTFσF1 a
F
32
Y F
eF eF
.
Even if we assume that third order derivatives are zero, we would still have an am-
biguous sign for eF2 . This is due to the fact that, as further illustrated in Appendix B, the
sign of aF32 (how direct intervention in the foreign country affects the impact that foreign
effort has on the attack effort of the terrorists in the foreign country) will depend on M12,
how the direct intervention and foreign effort interact in the reduction of the terrorists’
resources. Thus the sign of M12 is a crucial element in our analysis. For instance, if
M12 > 0, then increasing the effort of one party (home or foreign) reduces the negative
impact of the other party’s effort on terrorist capacity M .
Finally, we have an expression for the impact of military subsidy on foreign effort
eF3 =
1
−Y F
eF eF
> 0.
Clearly, an increase in the foreign effort subsidy, α, encourages foreign effort. This is
in line with BSY.
What we learn from this section is that, even if we make the same assumption about
third derivatives as BSY, we cannot sign eF2 : the impact of direct intervention on foreign
effort. This is realistic, the impact of US direct intervention in World War II on British
efforts to fight Germany was very different from the impact of US direct intervention in
South Vietnam on the South Vietnamese efforts at fighting the Viet Cong. As with BSY,
our results in stage 2 indicate that it is not possible to produce analytical results for the
overall SPNE in our model. We proceed however, to describe the first stage of the game
as it will provide a basis for the intuition of the results in our calibrated model.
3.2.3 Stage 1
We now proceed to stage 1 of the game where the home government chooses its counter-
terrorist strategy. In this section, we discuss the intuition of the FOCs that define the
internal solutions. In our calibration however, we will allow for corner solutions as well.
Maximizing (8) with respect to eH , eHF and α respectively, given the reaction functions
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(12), (13) and (16) gives the three FOCs for an internal solution eH , eHF , α > 0:
γ(eHF , η)[TH (σH1 (e
H , aH) + σH2 (e
H , aH)
(
aH1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aH3 e
F
1
)
+ THFσF1 (a
F )
(
aF1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aF3 e
F
1
)
] +
(
1 + αeF1
)
= 0. (17)
The first element of the FOC for home defensive effort in country H above represents
the positive direct impact of increasing home defensive effort as it directly reduces the
probability of a successful attack at home σH1 < 0. However, the increase in home defensive
effort eH encourages terrorists foreign attack effort, aF1 > 0, which in turn increases the
probability of a successful attack on home country interests in the foreign country, σF1 > 0.
In addition, an increase in home defensive effort affects the foreign country effort in an
ambiguous way, this change will affect both the cost of the subsidy given to the foreign
government (αeF1 ) and, indirectly, the attack efforts of the terrorists on countries H and
F , (aH3 e
F
1 and a
F
3 e
F
1 ). For the case when e
F
1 < 0, a
F
3 e
F
1 > 0, hence causing an increase
in the expected damage on national interests at foreign (i.e., the second term above is
positive).
pF1 (e
HF )η[THσH(eH , aH) + THFσF (aF )] + γ(eHF , η)[THσH2 (e
H , aH)
(
aH2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aH3 e
F
2
)
+THFσF1 (a
F )
(
aF2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aF3 e
F
2
)
] + (1 + αeF2 ) = 0. (18)
The first element on the left hand side, LHS, of the FOC for direct intervention effort
above is positive, it represents the positive impact that direct intervention has on the
probability of successful attack through its increase in the likelihood of regime change.
The third element in the FOC represents the impact on the cost of a change in the direct
intervention effort. The second element represents the impact of direct intervention on
the terrorists attack effort. An increase in direct intervention effort decreases this attack
effort directly (aH2 < 0 and a
F
2 < 0), but, it has an ambiguous indirect effect (a
H
3 e
F
2 ,
aF3 e
F
2 ) whose sign depends on the sign of e
F
2 . If home direct effort discourages the foreign
government’s effort, eF2 < 0 the indirect effect will undermine the direct effect. As already
discussed, the sign of eF2 will be determined by how the home and foreign effort interact
on the reduction of the terrorist resources.
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γ(eHF , η)[THσH2 (e
H , aH)aH3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + THFσF1 (a
F )aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )]eF3 (e
H , eHF , α)]
+(eF + αeF3 ) = 0. (19)
Given our results in stages 2 and 3, we know that the first element in the FOC for
military subsidy above is negative. It represents the negative impact that the military
subsidy to the foreign government, α, has on the expected damage on national interests by
the terrorists. The subsidy induces an increase in military effort by the foreign government(
eF3 > 0
)
and this reduces the terrorists attack effort both at foreign
(
aF3 < 0
)
and home(
aH3 < 0
)
countries.
It seems intuitive to argue that anything that enhances the impact of direct effort
on the probability of regime change should discourage such effort. Also the incentive to
undertake direct effort, will be determined by the relative effectiveness of the military
efforts of the foreign, eF , and the direct intervention by the home government, eHF , in
reducing terrorist resources: M1 and M2. Another important element will be the ease
with which a military subsidy is able to induce foreign effort, TF and φFwill be important
parameters to consider in this respect. If regime change caused a re-weighting of targets
on the objective function of the terrorist towards home, a lower φF , this would decrease
the incentive for direct action as it would reduce the incentive of the foreign country to
invest in effort.
4 Quantitative Analysis
So far, we have considered general functional forms. This has allowed us to highlight
the different strategic effects present in our model and how these effects can counteract
each other producing ambiguous results. In particular, the impact of defence and direct
intervention by home on foreign effort is ambiguous. This is to be expected; the nature
of such strategic interactions is likely to be sensitive to the particular circumstances of
the conflict. These circumstances will differ from case to case, thus there are no ”typical”
values of the parameters. In particular, direct intervention can take many different forms:
boots on the ground, manned aircraft, drones, special forces, intelligence operatives, cyber-
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warfare etc. Each of these will interact differently with the counter-terrorist efforts of the
foreign country. In the present section, we introduce specific functional forms and calibrate
the model using parameters that could describe particular conflicts in order to clarify the
likely nature of the strategic effects at play in our framework. It will also allow us to
obtain comparative statics results for the full set of equilibrium strategies presented in the
game. The calibration is particularly useful in illustrating the importance of the degree
of substitution between home and foreign military efforts and the relative effectiveness of
the two countries’ efforts at reducing the terrorist resources in determining whether direct
intervention might turn out to be an equilibrium outcome. Since, direct intervention is a
controversial choice we choose our parameters to focus on whether intervention happens
or not. We present our results using figures which we will interpret in the light of our
general model.
4.1 Choice of Functional Forms
There are three sets of functional forms to choose in order to conduct numerical solutions:
the probability of regime change, the success probabilities and the terrorist capacity func-
tion. We consider these in turn:
Probability of regime change: pF = pF (eHF ); (pF )′ > 0. Given this is a probability,
pF ∈ (0, 1), a logit functional form is a natural choice:
log
pF
1− pF
= αp + βpe
HF , (20)
which can be written as
pF =
exp(αp + βpe
HF )
1 + exp(αp + βpeHF )
. (21)
Terrorists’ success probability of an attack on F: σF = σF (aF ); σF1 > 0; σ
F
11 < 0
chosen so that σF ∈ [0, 1) and σF (0) = 0.
By analogy with (21) we choose
σF (aF ) =
exp(aF )− 1
1 + exp(aF )
, (22)
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then
σF1 (a
F ) =
2 exp(aF )
(1 + exp(aF ))2
> 0,
σF11(a
F ) =
2 exp(aF )(1− exp(aF ))
(1 + exp(aF ))3
< 0 if aF > 0.
Therefore, we have that one unit of terrorist capacity results in a success probability of
exp(1)−1
1+exp(1) = 0.4621 in the F country and (from below) in the H country if no counterterror-
ist effort is expended. In other words, a terrorist unit (or cell) results in 1/0.4621 = 2.164
successful attacks.
Terrorists’ success probability of an attack on H: σH = σH(eH , aH); σH1 < 0, σ
H
2 >
0, σH21 < 0, σ
H
11 > 0,σ
H
22 < 0.
We choose a contest success function of the general form
σH(eH , aH) =
f(aH)
f(aH) + f(βσeH)
,
where f(·) is an increasing function of normalized effort. A contest success function of
this form fulfills the five axioms of Skaperdas (1996) for any n ≥ 2 player contest. Hwang
(2012) discusses the choice of f(.).
In addition, we impose the conditions
σH(eH , 0) = 0,
σH(eH , aH) → 0 as eH →∞,
σH(eH , aH) → 1 as aH →∞,
for any eH , aH ≥ 0. The choice f(x) = exp(x)− 1 so that
σH(eH , aH) =
exp(aH)− 1
exp(aH) + exp(βσeH)− 2
,
satisfies all these conditions.
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With these functional forms we have the following first and second partial derivatives
σH1 (e
H , aH) = −
βσ exp(βσe
H)(exp(aH)− 1)
(exp(aH) + exp(βσeH)− 2)2
< 0 for all aH > 0,
σH2 (e
H , aH) =
exp(aH)(exp(βσe
H)− 1)
(exp(aH) + exp(βσeH)− 2)2
> 0 for all eH > 0,
σH11(e
H , aH) =
βσ
2 exp(βσe
H)(exp(aH)− 1)(2 + exp(βσe
H)− exp(aH))
(exp(aH) + exp(βσeH)− 2)3
≥ 0 iff 2 ≥ exp(aH)− exp(βσe
H),
σH22(e
H , aH) = −
exp(aH)(exp(βσe
H)− 1)(2 − exp(βσe
H) + exp(aH))
(exp(aH) + exp(βσeH)− 2)3
≤ 0 iff 2 ≥ exp(βσe
H)− exp(aH),
σH12(e
H , aH) = −
βσ exp(βσe
H + aH)(exp(βσe
H)− exp(aH))
(exp(aH) + exp(βσeH)− 2)3
≤ 0 for all aH , eH ≥ 0 if exp(βσe
H)− exp(aH) > 0.
It follows that all the conditions σH = σH(eH , aH); σH1 < 0, σ
H
2 > 0, σ
H
21 < 0, σ
H
11 > 0,
σH22 < 0 are satisfied iff a
H , eH ≥ 0, exp(βσe
H) > exp(aH) and
| exp(βσe
H)− exp(aH)| < 2.
That is, iff normalized efforts by the H country and the terrorist in that country are not
too far apart in equilibrium. These conditions impose the following bounds on σH
1
2
−
1
2 exp(aH)
< σH <
1
2
.
Terrorists’ Capacity: M(eF , eHF ); M1, M2 < 0, M11, M22 > 0.
TheM(eF , eHF ) function aggregates the military effectiveness of foreign, eF , and home,
eHF , efforts against enemy resources. In the literature on alliances, surveyed in Murdoch
(1995), considerable attention is paid to how the military efforts of allies should be aggre-
gated. The aggregation technology may be that strength depends on the simple sum of
military expenditures, the best shot in the alliance or the weakest link. Since we want to
examine the effects of differences in the degree of substitution between the efforts of H and
F , a natural choice for the aggregation technology is a constant elasticity of substitution,
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CES, production function. We assume:
M(eF , eHF ) = M¯ exp (−E)
where E is CES:
E =
(
(βMF e
F )ǫ + (βMHF e
HF )ǫ
) 1
ǫ −∞ < ǫ < 1.
The elasticity of substitution between the two forms of effort, eF and eHF is (1− ǫ)−1.
For ǫ = 1 we have the case of perfect substitutes, ǫ = 0 corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas
case with a unit elasticity of substitution, whilst as ǫ → −∞ we approach the Leontief
case, where they are not substitutes, both are required and overall effectiveness is given
by the minimum of the two terms. This would be the case, for instance, if both foreign’s
land and home’s air forces were required.5
We noted above that the relative military effectiveness of home and foreign forces is
likely to be a major determinant of whether the home country undertakes direct military
intervention. The parameters representing military effectiveness are βMHF and βMF .
These will reflect the technologies available to the two governments. For instance βMHF
would be large relative to βMF if the home government has access to drone technology
not available to the foreign government.
With this functional form we have that
M1 = −M¯ exp(−E)
∂E
∂eF
< 0,
M2 = −M¯ exp(−E)
∂E
∂eHF
< 0,
M11 = M¯ exp(−E)
((
∂E
∂eF
)2
−
∂2E
∂(eF )2
)
> 0,
M22 = M¯ exp(−E)
((
∂E
∂eHF
)2
−
∂2E
∂(eHF )2
)
> 0,
M12 = M21 = M¯ exp(−E)
(
∂E
∂eF
∂E
∂eHF
−
∂2E
∂eF∂eHF
)
.
5In principle there could be negative effects at this stage of the game: direct intervention by H reduces
the effectiveness of F ’s efforts. But then, there would be no trade-off between the negative effects through
the increase in the probability of regime change, accounted for in Stage 1, and the positive effects at Stage
3. In our rational agent model, this would not be an interesting case since then H would simply never
directly intervene (but may still subsidise foreign effort).
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Thus M1, M2 < 0 and M11, M22 > 0, but the sign of M12 is ambiguous since
M12 = M¯E exp(−E)
βǫMFβ
ǫ
MHF (e
F )ǫ−1(eHF )ǫ−1
((βMF eF )ǫ + (βMHF eHF )ǫ)
2 (E − 1 + ǫ).
SinceM1 < 0, M12 > 0 means that the higher the effort of one party (home or foreign) the
lower the negative impact of the other party’s effort on terrorist capacity M . For the case
of perfect substitutes, ǫ = 1 and M12 > 0. But for ǫ < 1 there is a high level of capacity
relative to its maximum at which E = log M¯
M
< 1− ǫ and M12 < 0. This condition can be
written
M
M¯
> exp(−(1− ǫ)).
At that point higher effort on one party actually increases the other party’s negative
impact on terrorist capacity.6
4.2 Calibration Strategy
To calibrate the parameters, we assume an observed baseline equilibrium for the variables
and solve for model parameters consistent with those observations. This baseline equilib-
rium can be described in terms of a vector of outcomes X = f(θ) where θ is a vector of
parameters. The calibration strategy is to choose a subset X1 of n observed outcomes to
calibrate a subset θ1 of n parameters. Partition X = [X1,X2] and θ = [θ1, θ2]. Then θ1
is then found by solving
[X1,X2] = f([θ1, θ2]), (23)
for X2 and θ1, given X1 and θ2. If such a solution exists for economically meaningful
parameter values (usually real positive numbers) θ1, then a successful calibration has
been achieved.
To implement this calibration strategy in the model we have seven parameters to be
set associated with success probabilities and terrorist capacity: αp, βp, η, βσ, M¯ , βMF
and βMHF . Further parameters associated with costs of successful attacks are T
H , THF ,
TF and φH . These are the parameters θ that determine the actions of the players eH ,
eHF , α for the H country, eF for the F country and aH , aF for the terrorists. Outcomes
6But note that this result depends on the exponential form of the function M . If instead we choose a
power function M = M¯E−1, then the sign of M12 is the same as 1− ǫ so for ǫ < 1 we have that M12 > 0
unambiguously.
21
from these actions, also determined by θ, are the probabilities σH , σ˜H , σF , σ˜F , pF and
the capability M .
We can first pin down the maximum terrorist capacity M¯ as follows. Consider a
scenario in the F country where there is no counterterrorist effort (eF = eHF = 0). Then
a maximum success probability, (σF )max is reached given by
(σF )max =
exp(M¯)− 1
1 + exp(M¯ )
⇒ M¯ = log
(
1 + (σF )max
1− (σF )max
)
.
If we can observe (σF )max, this then determines M¯ .
Second we impose φH = 1 − φF and consider variations as different scenarios. For
example φH = 0 (φH = 1) is the case where terrorists only target the F (H) country.
Third we construct fear factor outcomes from the equilibrium as follows. Consider a
worst-case scenario where attacks in both countries are successful. Then, the costs incurred
are TH +THF for the home country and TF for the foreign country which compares with
expenditures eH + eHF + αeF for the home country and eF (1−α) in the foreign country.
Then define ‘fear factor ’ parameters as the ratios of these costs
ffH =
TH + THF
eH + eHF + αeF
,
ffF =
TF
eF (1− α)
,
for the home and foreign countries respectively. Thus if we impose the ratio T
HF
TH
by
observing (or just targeting) these fear factors we can pin down TH and TF from any
equilibrium of eH , eHF and α.
The three parameters in the terrorist capacity function, which describe how H and
F ’s counter-terrorist efforts interact ǫ, βMF and βMHF , together with βσ in σ
H , which
determines the terrorists success probability are crucial for determining the choice of effort
by all parties in creating and reducing terrorist activity. We impose the elasticity ǫ and
consider variations as scenarios. For our baseline ǫ = 1, we then solve for parameters βσ
and βMF to achieve target probabilities σ
H and σF . This leaves βMHF which we assume
is equal to βMF .
This leaves parameters determining the probability of regime change αp and βpe
HF in
(20) and η determining the effect of regime change on σ˜H in (4). We impose βp and η
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and then calibrate αp to achieve a target for p
F . This completes the calibration strategy.
Table 1 summarizes the procedure.
Variable Target Outcome
βσ Home Success Probability σ
H
βMF Foreign Success Probability σ
F
αp Probability of Regime Change p
F
Inflicted Costs TH Home Fear Factor ffH
Inflicted Costs TF Foreign Fear Factor ffF
Inflicted Costs Abroad THF Assume THF = TH
Direct Intervention Effect on Capacity βMHF Assume βMHF = βMF
Max Military Capacity M¯ Max of probability σF
Table 1: Parameters to Calibrate and the Target Outcomes
4.3 Equilibrium Computation
We now present results for the following choice of imposed parameters values summarized
in Table 1: φH = φF = 0.5, η = 0.5, (σF )max = 0.75, βp = 0.1 and ǫ = 1. To calibrate
the remaining parameters, we choose the following target outcomes: σH = 0.1, σF = 0.2,
pF = 0.25 and ffH = ffF = 5. With these targets we compute the parameters implied by
the equilibrium as set out in Table 1. The results for the equilibrium and actual outcomes
are set out in the first column of Table 2. The calibrated parameters turned out as:
βσ = βMF = βMHF = 2.2, T
H = TF = 1.5. As can be seen from the Table, we were not
able to hit the targets exactly but we came close.7
With these parameter values, we find a Stage 1 equilibrium with eH = 0.38, α = 0.24
and eHF = 0 and eF = 0.53 at Stage 2 of the game.8 In this equilibrium, success
probabilities are σH = 0.10 and σF = 0.23. Thus the Home country chooses not to
intervene directly and 10% of attacks are successful in the home country and 23% of
attacks in the foreign country. In Figure 1 and 2 variations in α about this equilibrium
are plotted. In Figures 3 and 4 we plot variations in eH and in Figures 5 and 6 variations
in eHF for the case of ǫ = 1.
7One cannot assume that a solution to (23) exists for all equilibrium outcomes.
8We searched over a grid with intervals 0.005 in the space of stage 1 decisions (eH , α, eHF ). We report
the equilibrium corresponding to the global minimum of the welfare loss for country H equal to minus the
utility given by (8). The grid was chosen to be consistent with the outcomes used in the calibration.
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The plots in Figures 1 and 2 confirm the results from the general model. An increase
in the foreign military subsidy α encourages foreign effort and this in turn will decrease
the incentive that the terrorists have to invest in attack effort both home and foreign. As
a result, the terrorist attack success probabilities decrease. Note that the Home welfare
loss function is minimized at the baseline equilibrium value of α = 0.24.
Figures 3 and 4 clarify the ambiguous effect that changes in home defensive effort
has on foreign effort. Our plot indicates an initially positive and then declining impact of
defensive effort on foreign effort. Note that for low values of home defensive effort, the plot
for terrorist attack effort in country H, aH , has a positive slope with the slope becoming
negative later (this is also the case for the impact of eH on aF , which is illustrated by
the slope turning from negative to positive for higher levels of defensive effort). Our
Appendix demonstrates that the sign of the impact of home defensive effort on the home
attack effort and foreign attack effort is reversed when σH21 > 0. This will happen if
eH < a
H
βσ
or eH < a
H
2.2 . Note that the Home welfare loss function is minimized at the
baseline equilibrium value of eH = 0.52.
In Figures 3 and 4, we also see the indirect impact that defensive effort has on the
attack efforts of the terrorist through its impact on foreign effort. As the Figures show, this
impact is ambiguous as well, for low values of defensive effort increases in this effort will
encourage foreign effort, a clear crowding out effect develops for higher levels of defensive
effort. The indirect effect reinforces the impact that defensive effort has on foreign attack
effort aF , however, it generates a counteracting force for the direct impact of eH on aH .
The sign of direct effect however prevails as described in our previous paragraph. Although
our setting is different from BSY, they also get a crowding out effect of defensive effort on
foreign effort under a σH21 < 0 assumption.
Figures 5 and 6 clarify the ambiguous effect of direct intervention of foreign effort. For
the case where direct intervention and foreign effort interact as perfect substitutes in the
lowering of terrorist resources, we have that direct intervention crowds out foreign effort
(see Figure 6). As seen in the theoretical framework, the impact of direct intervention
of attack efforts was negative for both foreign and home attack effort as it reduced the
resources available to the terrorists, however, the crowding out of foreign effort counteracts
the first effect as this in turn increases the terrorist resources. As the plots show, the
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impact that these effects together have on attack efforts and therefore attack success rates
is negligible. Note that in this case we have a corner solution as the welfare loss function
is minimized at eHF = 0.
So far, under the assumption that the efforts of the home and foreign country are
perfect substitutes, ǫ = 1, the Stage 1 equilibrium involves no direct military intervention
(eHF = 0). We have seen from the analysis that the sign of ∂e
F
∂eHF
is ambiguous. In fact with
our parameter setting we see that ∂e
F
∂eHF
< 0 so military intervention by the home country
crowds out anti-terrorist effort by the foreign country and is counterproductive. However,
we are now in a position to examine what happens if we reduce the degree of substitution
between eF and eHF by lowering ǫ. With ǫ = 0.5, Figures 7 and 8 show this now produces
a Stage 1 equilibrium with some military intervention with eHF = 0.025 (where the welfare
loss function is now minimized). Therefore, the nature of the technology by which H and
F influence terrorist capacity is crucial for the choice of direct intervention. Figure 9
presents a 3-dimensional plot of the equilibrium for the ǫ = 1 case.
Next we explore the corner solution at which direct military intervention is welfare-
reducing for the home country by constructing a measure of the home versus foreign
relative military efficiency defined by β ≡ βMHF
βMF
. Up to now, we have set β = 1. Figure 10
then plots β against the threshold value of ǫ at which the corner solution to the equilibrium,
eHF = 0, occurs. We see that as β increases, with low substitution between home and
foreign effort, direct intervention emerges as a possible equilibrium.
We see that around the equilibrium where direct intervention does not happen, in-
creases in relative military efficiency will increase the threshold level of the elasticity of
substitution below which direct intervention becomes a possibility.
Columns 2–4 of Table 2 set out the full equilibrium for the case of imperfect substitution
between eF and eHF with ǫ = 0.75, 0.5, and 0.25. We see that, in these equilibria, there is
steady reduction of military aid to 0 and with some substitution by the country H towards
more combined expenditure on both defensive effort and direct intervention. The former
disincentivises and the latter crowds out counter-terrorist effort eF by the F country.
Terrorism ceases owing to the reduction of their capacity and the success probability
falls to zero in the country H. Eventually, for ǫ = 0.25, the success probability falls
substantially in the F country as well.
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Table 2 shows that the impact of a decrease in the elasticity of substitution between
foreign effort and direct intervention effort has a clear negative impact on the subsidy to
the foreign country. However, the impact of lowering the elasticity on the different effort
levels is non linear. We start at a point at which efforts are perfect substitutes and, for our
set of parameters assumptions, direct intervention does not take place. From that point,
a decrease in the elasticity of substitution to 0.75 leads to an initial increase in all efforts,
including direct intervention. This leads to a reduction to zero in the success probability
of terrorists attacks on H. Terrorists shift their effort to attacking F thereby increasing
the foreign success probability. However, a further decrease in the elasticity to 0.5 leads to
a further increase in direct intervention effort, this time coupled with a reduction in home
defence effort: a lower defence effort still maintains a zero chance of successful attacks
at home. Foreign effort falls as higher direct intervention effort takes over the task of
reducing the foreign success probability of the terrorists. As the elasticity of substitution
falls to 0.25 lower levels of all types of effort are now enough to maintain very low success
probabilities.
Note that the decrease in elasticity reduces the success probabilities at all levels. For
constant levels of effort by H and F , as their efforts become poorer substitutes, the total
effect of their efforts on the terrorists increase. Military doctrine emphasises how joint
operations between different types of forces, (land, sea or air) are more effective than
operations which must rely on a single type of force. Skill at combined arms fighting is a
characteristic of a good commander.
Historically, the crucial parameters (for relative military effectiveness,β, and substitu-
tion ǫ) have been determined not just by technology but also by social and institutional
factors. An example of social factors is that troops from rich countries, like the US, are
less willing to suffer the privations than those from poor countries, like the Viet Cong and
Taliban, were willing to suffer. An example of institutional constraints is given by Allen
and Leeson (2015). For over a century, the longbow was the most effective missile weapon
but only English Kings used it in conjunction with their other forces. The Scots and
French did not adopt longbows, but relied on their cavalry, mounted Knights, which were
vulnerable to arrows, despite being repeatedly beaten by the English. This was because
they faced a trade-off between internal threats, from their nobles, and external threats.
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England alone was sufficiently stable to risk training its troops to use the longbow. A
more recent example of the impact of institutional constraints on effectiveness is given by
Garicano and Posner (2005). The US FBI was less effective in anti-terrorist activities as a
result of combining those activities with crime-fighting, which required an organisational
design and incentives unsuited to the counter-intelligence and counter-terrorist mission.
They argue that organisations, like the UK Security Service, MI5, which had a dedicated
counter-espionage role were more effective.
Variable Value Value Value Value
Elasticity ǫ 1.0 0.75 0.5 0.25
Home expenditure eH 0.380 0.410 0.405 0.390
Military Aid α 0.240 0.110 0.005 0
Expenditure on Direct Intervention eHF 0 0.010 0.025 0.020
Foreign Expenditure eF 0.53 0.58 0.43 0.20
Home Success Probability σH 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Success Probability σF 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.07
Home Fear Factor ffH 5.38 5.73 6.56 6.81
Home Expected Cost to Expenditure σHffH 0.54 0 0 0
Foreign Fear Factor ffF 3.72 2.91 3.51 7.51
Foreign Expected Cost to Expenditure σF ffF 0.86 0.72 0.79 0.55
Probability of Regime Change pF 0.250 0.250 0.251 0.250
Table 2: Stage 1 Computed Equilibrium: eF and eHF perfect substitutes and imperfect
(ǫ ∈ [0, 1]). φH = 0.5, η = 0.5, (σF )max = 0.75
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of a conflict in which two countries, home and foreign, under
threat of terrorist attack, interact non-cooperatively with the objective of limiting the
expected damage done by the terrorists. Whereas the terrorists follow an offensive strategy,
with the objective of causing damage to both countries, the two countries follow a defensive
strategy, with the objective of limiting the expected damage. The two countries face
different types of threat. The foreign country can only be damaged by terrorist attacks
in their own territory. The home country, has national interests in both countries which
can be damaged by the terrorists.
The two countries have different policy instruments. The foreign country just decides
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the level of effort it devotes to limiting the resources available to the terrorists to carry
out their attacks. The home country decides its effort on defence to protect its national
territory, its military subsidy to encourage its foreign ally to attack terrorists assets and
its own direct intervention against the terrorists.
We model the interaction between the countries and the terrorist group as a multiple
stage game where the home country first commits to their policy decisions, then the foreign
government does, finally, the terrorist group decides how much effort to put into terrorist
actions against the home or foreign country. We solve the game using backward induction.
The objective of our analysis is to identify the elements in the interaction among the
different players which will explain the circumstances under which direct intervention will
be part of an equilibrium. Our theoretical model shows different effects at play and these
often counteract each other, a characteristic feature of many conflicts. Our modeling
strategy expands the BSY framework in a number of ways, the main difference is that we
allow for direct intervention and investigate its interaction with foreign effort. As we find
the solution to the model, unlike BSY we do not restrict ourselves by presuming that the
third order derivatives of probability functions are zero.
Our backward induction method allows us to show that an increase in either direct
intervention effort by the home government or the foreign government effort will unam-
biguously reduce terrorist attacks both on the home and the foreign country. An increase
in defensive home effort however will discourage terrorist attack effort at home but will en-
courage attack effort abroad. As we proceed to the second stage we find that whereas the
military subsidy to the foreign government has a clear positive impact on foreign effort.
The impact of both defensive and direct intervention efforts are ambiguous. However,
our use of calibration allows us to resolve the sign of these effects and find the overall
equilibrium.
Our calibration results confirm the positive impact of the military subsidy on foreign
effort and identify a negative impact of direct intervention on foreign effort. The closer
the degree of substitution between direct intervention and foreign effort, the stronger this
crowding out effect on foreign effort.
Calibration of the model also allows us to find the overall backward induction solution
to the model. For the chosen parameters, we are able to show that direct intervention
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will only be part of the equilibrium if the foreign and home effort are poor substitutes in
the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. In addition we show
that direct intervention will become more likely as the effectiveness of the home country
at reducing the terrorists resources relative to that of the foreign country increases.
Within the framework of this game, there is scope to examine the effect of a number
of exogenous factors that change the incentive for the home country to intervene directly,
including the probability of blowback which strengthens the terrorists, for instance through
regime change.
Appendix A
As explained in the main text, we solve the game using backwards induction.
First, using the third stage Lagrangian equation we find the first order conditions for
the optimization problem of terrorists:
σH2 (e
H , aH)− λM + λa
H
= 0, (24)
τσF1 (a
F )− λM + λa
F
= 0, (25)
λM (M(eF , eHF )− aH − aF ) = 0, (26)
λa
H
aH = 0, (27)
λa
F
aF = 0, (28)
aH , aF , M − aH − aF , λM , λa
H
, λa
F
≥ 0. (29)
Equations (24)–(29) constitute the stage 3 equilibrium given previous actions eH , eHF , eF .
Clearly the capacity constraint must bind at the optimum so λM = 0. For an internal
solution aH , aF > 0 we must also have that λa
H
= λa
F
= 0 so that
σH2 (e
H , aH) = τσF1 (a
F ) = τσF1 (M − a
H), (30)
which equates the marginal utility from effort by the terrorist in countries H and F . The
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second order condition for the internal solution is
σH22(e
H , aH) + τσF11(M − a
H) < 0, (31)
which is guaranteed by the conditions σH22, σ
F
11 < 0.
Second, using the second stage Lagrangian equation we find the first order conditions
for the optimization problem of the foreign government:
γ(eHF , η)σF1 (a
F )TFaF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + 1− α− λe
F
= 0, (32)
λe
F
eF = 0, (33)
where to compute aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ), we differentiate the FOCs from stage 3 to obtain four
additional equations to compute aF3 , a
H
3 , λ
aF
3 and λ
aH
3
τσF11(a
F )− σH22(e
H , aH)aH3 − λ
aH
3 + λ
aF
3 = 0, (34)
λa
H
3 a
H + λa
H
aH3 = 0, (35)
λa
F
3 a
F + λa
F
aF3 = 0, (36)
M1 − a
H
3 − a
F
3 = 0. (37)
The FOCs and Second Order Conditions (SOCs) for an internal solution eF > 0,
aF > 0, aH > 0, λe
F
= λa
H
= λa
F
= λa
H
3 = λ
aF
3 = 0 are
γ(eHF , η)σ1(a
F )TFaF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + 1− α = 0, (38)
−γ(eHF , η)TF (σ11(a
F )(aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ))2 + σ1(a
F )aF33(e
H , eHF , eF )) < 0. (39)
To complete the equilibrium we require expressions for aHi (e
H , eHF , eF ), aFi (e
H , eHF , eF )
and eFi (e
H , eHF , α; i = 1, 3). aF3 and a
H
3 have already been obtained at Stage 2. Now,
differentiating stage 3 condition (30) with respect to eH , eHF and eF respectively gives
σH21(e
H , aH) + σH22(e
H , aH) aH1 (e
H , eHF eF ) = τ σF11(a
F ) aF1 (e
H , eHF , eF ), (40)
aH1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aF1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) = 0, (41)
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σH22(e
H , aH) aH2 (e
H , eHF eF ) = τ σF11(a
F ) aF2 (e
H , eHF , eF ), (42)
aH2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aF2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) = M2(e
F , eHF ), (43)
σH22(e
H , aH) aH3 (e
H , eHF eF ) = τ σF11(a
F ) aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ), (44)
aH3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) = M1(e
F , eHF ). (45)
Given the functional forms for the probabilities pF , σH , σF and M considered in the
quantitative analysis section, we have so far 12 equations in 6 choice variables eH , eHF ,
α for country H, eF for country F , aH and aF for terrorists; and 7 reaction function
derivatives aH1 , a
F
1 , a
H
2 , a
F
2 , a
H
3 , a
F
3 and e
F
3 .
It remains to find expressions for eFi , i = 1, 3. To do this first differentiate (38) with
respect to eH , eHF and α to obtain respectively:
γ(eHF , η)TF
[
σ11(a
F )(aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ))2 + σ1(a
F )aF33(e
H , eHF , eF )eF1 (e
H , eHF , α)
]
= 0,
(46)
γ(eHF , η)TF
[
σ11(a
F )(aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ))2 + σ1(a
F )aF33(e
H , eHF , eF )eF2 (e
H , eHF , α)
]
= 0,
(47)
γ(eHF , η)TF
[
σ11(a
F )(aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ))2 + σ1(a
F )aF33(e
H , eHF , eF )eF3 (e
H , eHF , α)
]
− 1 = 0.
(48)
Finally, differentiating (37) and (38) with respect to eF , we have
σH222(e
H , aH) (aH3 (e
H , eHF , eF ))2 + σH22(e
H , aH) aH33(e
H , eHF eF ))
= τ [σF111(a
F ) (aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ))2 + σF11a
F
33(e
H , eHF eF ))],
(49)
aH33(e
H , eHF , eF ) + aF33(e
H , eHF , eF ) = M11(e
F , eHF ). (50)
Equations (46)–(50) provide five additional equations for aH33, a
F
33 and e
F
i , i = 1, 3 com-
pleting the equilibrium.
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Appendix B
Stage 3
As in BSY, terrorists choose their attack effort distribution across their base country,
foreign and home, aH and aF that maximize their objective function subject to their
resource constraint. For the interior solution, we find the tangency condition:
φHTHσH2 (e
H , aH) =
(
φHTHF + φFTF
)
σF1 (a
F ).
Substituting budget constraint
aF =M(eF , eHF )− aH ,
we get:
φHTHσH2 (e
H , aH)− [φHTHF + φFTF ]
∂σF (M(eF , eHF ) − aH)
∂aF
= 0.
The following results can be established using the Implicit Function Theorem and the
assumptions over the properties of the probabilities of successful attack σH1 < 0, σ
H
2 >
0, σH11 > 0, σ
H
22 < 0, σ
F
1 > 0, σ
F
11 < 0.
Following BSY, we define
D = −
[
φHTHσH22(e
H , aH) + [φHTHF + φFTF ]σF11(a
F )
]
> 0.
Now, using the IFT, we obtain the following expressions for the impact of the different
country efforts on the attack efforts of the terrorists:
aH1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =
φHTHσH21(e
H , aH)
D
=
φHTHσH21
D
< 0⇔ σH21 < 0,
aF1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) = −aH1 (e
H , eHF , eF ) = −aH1 > 0⇔ σ
H
21 < 0,
aH2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =
[φHTHF + φFTF ]σF11(a
F )M2(e
F , eHF )
−D
=
[φHTHF + φFTF ]σF11M2
−D
< 0,
aF2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =M2(e
F , eHF )−aH2 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =
φHTHσH22(e
H , aH)M2(e
F , eHF )
−D
=
φHTHσH22M2
−D
< 0,
32
aH3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =
[φHTHF + φFTF ]σF11(a
F )M1(e
F , eHF )
−D
=
[φHTHF + φFTF ]σF11M1
−D
< 0,
aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =M1(e
F , eHF )−aH3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) =
φHTHσH22(e
H , aH)M1(e
F , eHF )
−D
=
φHTHσH22M1
−D
< 0.
In addition,
φHTHσH2 (e
H , aH)− [φHTHF + φFTF ]
∂σF (M(eF , eHF ) − aH)
∂aF
= 0,
∂aH3
∂φH
=
THσH2 − T
HFσF1
D
,
∂aF3
∂φH
= −
THσH2 − T
HFσF1
D
.
Note that, σH2 > 0 and σ
F
1 > 0, hence, the above will depend on parameters. Finally,
we have
∂aH3
∂TH
=
φHσH2
D
> 0,
∂aF3
∂TH
= −
φHσH2
D
< 0.
Stage 2
The FOC for an internal solution eF > 0 can be written as
−γ(eHF , η)σF1 (a
F )aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )TF − 1 + α = 0,
which leads to the reaction function of country F as
eF = eF (eH , eHF , α).
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The second order condition implies
Y FeF eF = −γ(e
HF , η)TF
[
σF11(a
F )
(
aF3
)2
+ σF1 (a
F )aF33
]
= −γTF
[
σF11
(
aF3
)2
+ σF1 a
F
33
]
< 0.
Note that
aH33 =
τσF111(−a
H
3 )
2 − σH222 (a
H
3 )
2 + τσF11M11
σH22 + τσ
F
11
,
aF33(e
H , eHF , eF ) =M11 −
τσF111(−a
H
3 )
2 − σH222 (a
H
3 )
2 + τσF11M11
σH22 + τσ
F
11
or
aF33(e
H , eHF , eF ) =
σH22M11 + (−a
H
3 )
2
(
σH222 − τσ
F
111
)
σH22 + τσ
F
11
.
Now, we know that, for the second order condition to hold, we need
Y FeF eF = −γT
F
[
σF11
(
aF3
)2
+ σF1 a
F
33
]
= −γTF
[
σF11
(
aF3
)2
+ σF1 a
F
33
]
< 0.
For the above to hold, we need aF33 >> 0. For that, we need M11 >> 0, even if we
assumed third order derivatives to be equal to zero.
For the comparative statics results we first need to find explicit expressions for aF31 and
aF32. For that, we differentiate (44) and (45) with respect to e
H and eHF and substitute
into each other:
First, aF31
σH22(e
H , aH)
(
M1(e
F , eHF )− aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )
)
= τσF11(a
F )aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )
aH3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) = M1(e
F , eHF )− aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )
(
σH221(e
H , aH) + σH222(e
H , aH)aH1
) (
M1(e
F , eHF )− aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )
)
+σH22(e
H , aH)
(
−aF31(e
H , eHF , eF )
)
= τσF111(a
F )aF1 a
F
3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + τσF11(a
F )aF31(e
H , eHF , eF )
aF31 =
(
σH221 + σ
H
222a
H
1
)
aH3 − τ σ
F
111a
F
1 a
F
3
τ σF11 + σ
H
22
.
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In general, the sign of the above is ambiguous. However, if we assumed third order
derivatives are zero, as BSY do, it would be zero.
Second, aF32
σH22(e
H , aH)
[
M12(e
F , eHF )− aF32(e
H , eHF , eF )
]
+σH222(e
H , aH)aH2
[
M1(e
F , eHF )− aF3 (e
H , eHF , eF )
]
= τσF111(a
F )aF2 a
F
3 (e
H , eHF , eF ) + τ σF11(a
F )aF32(e
H , eHF , eF ).
We rewrite to get
aF32(e
H , eHF , eF ) =
σH22M12 + σ
H
222a
H
2
[
M1 − a
F
3
]
− τ σF111a
F
2 a
F
3
σH22 + τ σ
F
11
.
Once more, the sign of the above is ambiguous, but in this case, even if we assume
that third order derivatives are zero, we are still left with
aF32(e
H , eHF , eF ) =
σH22M12
σH22 + τ σ
F
11
The sign of the above will be positive as long as M12 > 0, since all the other terms are
negative.
Now we can proceed to comparative statics result. Using the IFT and results from
third stage, aH(eH , eHF , eF ) and aF (eH , eHF , eF ),we get:
First,
∂eF
∂eH
= eF1 =
Y F
eF eH
−Y F
eF eF
=
−γ(eHF ,η)TF σF
11
(aF )aF
1
aF
3
(eH ,eHF ,eF )−γ(eHF ,η)TF σF
1
aF
31
−Y F
eF eF
=
γTF (σF11aF1 aF3 +σF1 aF31)
Y F
eF eF
.
If we assumed third order derivatives are zero as BSY do, then aF31 = 0 and the above
would have a clear negative sign. Otherwise the sign will be ambiguous.
Second,
∂eF
∂α
= eF3 =
Y F
eFα
−Y F
eF eF
=
1
−Y F
eF eF
> 0.
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Third,
∂eF
∂eHF
= eF2 =
Y F
eF eHF
−Y F
eF eF
=
−γ1(eHF ,η)TF σF1 (a
F )aF
3
(eH ,eHF ,eF )−γ(eHF ,η)TF σF
11
(aF )aF
2
aF
3
(eH ,eHF ,eF )−γTF σF
1
aF
32
−Y F
eF eF
=
TF aF
3 (γ1σF1 +γσF11aF2 )+γTF σF1 aF32
Y F
eF eF
> 0.
As discussed in the main text, even if we assume that third order derivatives are zero,
we would still have an ambiguous sign for aF32 which would depend on the sign of M12. As
σF1 > 0, we would need a
F
32 < 0 to not get an ambiguous sign above, for zero third order
derivatives this would happen if M12 < 0.
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Figure 1: Stage 2: Response to α for Home Country. eH = 0.38, eHF = 0.
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Figure 2: Stage 2: Response to α for Foreign Country. eH = 0.38, eHF = 0
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Figure 3: Stage 2: Response to eH for Home Country. α = 0.21, eHF = 0
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Figure 4: Stage 2: Response to eH for Foreign Country. α = 0.24, eHF = 0
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Figure 5: Stage 2: Response to eHF for Home Country. eH , eHF Perfect Substi-
tutes. α = 0.24, eH = 0.38
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Figure 6: Stage 2: Response to eHF for Foreign Country. eF , eHF Perfect
Substitutes. α = 0.24, eH = 0.38
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Figure 7: Stage 2: Response to eHF for Home Country. eF , eHF Imperfect
Substitutes (ǫ = 0.5). α = 0.21, eH = 0.38
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Figure 8: Stage 2: Response to eHF for Foreign Country. eF , eHF Imperfect
Substitutes (ǫ = 0.5). α = 0.21, eH = 0.38
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Figure 9: Stage 1: Optimal Choice of eH and α with eHF = 0 (eH and eHF Perfect
Substitutes).
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Figure 10: Stage 2: Threshold of ǫ as Relative Home/Foreign Military Efficiency
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